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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,   )
  ) NO. 44687
Plaintiff-Respondent,   )
  ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2015-12589
v.   )
  )
BENJAMIN ZIMBALIST PITTMAN,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
  )
Defendant-Appellant.   )
_______________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Benjamin Zimbalist Pittman pled guilty to felony domestic battery.  The district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  After
Mr. Pittman completed his rider, and notwithstanding the recommendation of the Idaho
Department of Correction (“IDOC”) to grant probation, the district court relinquished
jurisdiction.  Mr. Pittman filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, and the district
court  denied  it.   On  appeal,  Mr.  Pittman  asserts  that  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  by
imposing an excessive sentence, by relinquishing jurisdiction, and by denying his motion for
Rule 35 leniency.
2Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Pittman, 23, had been dating Danielle Lance for approximately two years.  (PSI,
pp.2, 39.)1  They had fought in the past, and despite a no contact order, they were living together
at a friend’s apartment in Boise.  (PSI, p.39.)  On August 13, 2015, they had an argument about
their relationship; Ms. Lance had been seeing someone else, and Mr. Pittman became upset.
(PSI, p.39.) He told her they could not be together anymore and began packing up her clothing.
(PSI, p.39.)  The argument grew loud and became physical; she kicked him, he hit her and
shoved her to the ground, and they engaged in a scuffle leaving marks on Ms. Lance’s neck.
(R., pp.41-42; PSI, pp.39-46.)
Mr.  Pittman  and  Ms.  Lance  reconciled  and  moved  to  Georgia  for  a  short  time.   When
they returned to Boise, Mr. Pittman was arrested and charged with attempted strangulation,
violation of a no contact order, and misdemeanor battery.  (R., pp.13-16.)
Pursuant  to  the  terms  of  a  plea  agreement,  Mr.  Pittman  pled  guilty  to  felony  domestic
battery and agreed to submit to a domestic violence evaluation.  (R., pp.41-42; Tr., p.8, Ls.8-25.)
In exchange, the State agreed to ask for a sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and to
recommend  either  probation  or  a  rider,  depending  on  the  results  of  the  evaluation.   (Tr.,  p.9,
Ls.3-7.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the court to sentence Mr. Pittman to a term of
seven years, with two years fixed; because the evaluation indicated Mr. Pittman presented a high
risk for re-offense, the State recommended a rider.  (PSI, pp.11-12; Tr., p.25, Ls.11-15.)
Mr. Pittman asked the court to place him on probation, informing the court he had a job waiting,
1 Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and attached materials will use the
designation “PSI” and will include the page numbers associated with the 195-page electronic file
containing those documents.
3and had enrolled himself in an intensive, outpatient behavioral health treatment program, as had
been recommended in his GAIN-1 Assessment and Domestic Violation Evaluation.  (Tr., p.28,
Ls.6-12; PSI, pp.12-13, 55.)  The district court adopted the State’s recommendation and imposed
a seven-year sentence, with two years fixed.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.22–24.)  The court retained
jurisdiction so that Mr. Pittman could participate in intensive counseling and treatment, and
“earn ultimately a probation recommendation” from IDOC’s retained jurisdiction program.
(Tr., p.33, Ls.9-18.)
Mr. Pittman successfully completed his rider program, and the IDOC recommended
probation.   (PSI,  p.188.)   As  its  basis  for  that  recommendation,  the  IDOC cited  Mr.  Pittman’s
“positive changes in his thinking patterns, attitudes and beliefs”; that he had “participated well in
activities and completed all assigned programs satisfactorily”; and, finally, that he was “not seen
as a serious disciplinary problem indicating [he] should be able to follow the rules of probation.”
(PSI, p.188.)
The district court declined to follow the recommendation, however, and entered an order
relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.67-68; Tr., p.40, Ls.3-6.)  Mr. Pittman filed a notice of appeal
from the order that same day.
Mr. Pittman timely filed Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, together with a letter
detailing the positive insight he gained through the rider program.  (R., pp.73-77.)  The district
court denied the motion.  (R., pp.78-79.)  Mr. Pittman filed another Rule 35 motion, asking the
court to reconsider its previous order, and provided a letter outlining his probation plan.
(R., pp.80-82.)  The district court denied that motion, too.  (R., pp.84-85.)
4On appeal, Mr. Pittman contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
a sentence that was excessive under the circumstances, by relinquishing jurisdiction, and by
denying his first Rule 35 motion.
ISSUES
1. Did  the  district  court  abuse  its  discretion  when  it  imposed  a  unified  sentence  of  seven
years, with two years fixed, following Mr. Pittman’s plea of guilty to domestic battery?
2. In  light  of  Mr.  Pittman’s  successful  completion  of  his  rider,  and  the  IDOC’s
recommendation for probation, did the district court abuse its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction instead of placing him on probation?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Pittman’s Rule 35 Motion
for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the new information he presented?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Pittman To A Unified Term Of
Seven Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following Mr. Pittman’s Plea Of Guilty To Domestic
Battery
Where a defendant challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho
828, 834 (2011).  The Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of
discretion,  which  occurs  if  the  district  court  imposed  a  sentence  that  is  unreasonable,  and  thus
excessive, “under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.
5Mr. Pittman was adopted as an infant, after his biological parents left him at the hospital
with cocaine and syphilis in his blood.  (PSI, p.45.)  Although his adoptive mother, Maybelle
Pittman, raised him as a single parent in a loving and supportive family, Mr. Pittman has
struggled with abandonment issues.  (PSI, pp.6, 45, 131.)
As a teenager, he was sent away from his home to live with uncles.  (PSI, p.45.)  While
living away, he had a romantic relationship and, in 2009, he became a father; he was 18 years
old.  (PSI, p.45.)  He was moved to Boise to live with another uncle and complete his schooling;
he worked odd jobs and sent money to his child’s mother.  (PSI, pp.45, 48.)  His uncle moved
away, back to California, and Mr. Pittman became homeless for a time.  (PSI, pp.45, 47.)  He had
another, brief, romantic relationship, and a second child, a son, in 2013.  (PSI, p.47.)
In 2014, Mr. Pittman began dating Ms. Lance, the victim in this case.  (PSI, p.46.)  On
the day of the offense,  Ms. Lance had disclosed that she was seeing someone else.   (PSI,  pp.6,
39.)  Mr. Pittman was hurt and became upset. (PSI, pp.7, 39.)
He told his presentence investigator that he felt “horrible” about his actions against
Ms. Lance, (PSI, p.9), and “I feel bad about everything because I love her deeply and wish it
never would [have] went down like that … I tak[e] full responsibility in my actions.”  (PSI,
p.39.)  He arrived at his sentencing hearing, ready to begin the intensive programming
recommended  by  the  GAIN-1  Assessment  and  the  Domestic  Violence  Evaluation.   (Tr.,  p.30,
Ls.16-19.)  He also addressed the court, acknowledging:
I [made] mistakes in my past, and I take responsibility for my mistakes.  I don’t
want the errors of my past to define the man and the father that I know I have the
potential to be.  I know very well not having a father figure in one’s life, I would
never want my children to have that experience.
I’m looking forward to attending the 52 weeks of domestic violence classes and
cognitive self-change classes, not only so I can be a more productive citizen in the
6community but so I can be a better father and better man for both my family and
myself.
(PSI, p.29, Ls.9-21.)
Mr. Pittman’s difficulty with abandonment certainly cannot not justify his behavior
toward Ms. Lance; he has taken responsibility for actions that he knows were wrong.  (PSI,
p.39.)  He cannot change his past, but he desperately wants to change how he allows that past to
influence his behaviors in the present.  (PSI, p.46.)  His remorse and responsibility for his actions
serve as mitigation his case. See State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008).
In light of the mitigating circumstances presented in this case, and notwithstanding the
aggravating  ones,  Mr.  Pittman’s  sentence  of  seven  years,  with  two  fixed,  is  excessive  and
therefore unreasonable, representing an abuse of discretion.
II.
In Light Of Mr. Pittman’s Success During His Rider, The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Instead of Suspending His Sentence and Placing Him on Probation
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998).  A court’s decision to relinquish
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information
to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194 (Ct. App. 1984).
Mr.  Pittman’s  performance  during  the  rider,  and  the  IDOC’s  considered  assessment  of
Mr.  Pittman’s  performance,  warrant  probation  in  this  case.   First,  Mr.  Pittman  successfully
completed the requirements of the Cognitive-Behavior Interventions for Substance Abuse
course.  As described by his program facilitator, Mr. Pittman “was an appropriate group
participant that completed all assigned work on time during this session.”  (PSI, p.184.)
7Despite his propensity for wearing the humor mask, Mr. Pittman was able to
repeatedly demonstrate that he was paying attention to what was being discussed
in group and the skills taught in this group.  He was able to navigate all of the
skills and chose relevant and realistic high-risk situations to utilize these skills in.
(PSI, p.184.)
Mr. Pittman also successfully completed the IDOC’s Aggression Replacement Training
course, and its Pre-release Program.  (PSI, pp.185, 186.)  He learned that his behavior will
continue to affect his life and the choices that will be made available to him.  (PSI, p.184.) He
recognized the importance of making changes to his social circle, and he came to appreciate the
negative consequences, should he fail to make those changes.  (PSI, p.184.)
Mr.  Pittman’s  rider  performance  was  not  perfect.   Over  the  course  of  the  program,  he
accrued a variety of informal reprimands, ranging from trading food with another offender, to
sleeping during count, to using an office window as a personal mirror.  (PSI, p.184.)  He also
received one formal disciplinary violation, late into the program, after a collection of personal,
although unauthorized, items2 was found in his cell.  (PSI, p.183).  However, these violations
were neither severe nor criminal in nature, and did not warrant relinquishing jurisdiction.
Significantly,  the IDOC – well  aware of these infractions – concluded Mr. Pittman “was not a
serious disciplinary problem,” indicating that he “should be able to follow the rules of
probation.”  (PSI, p.188.)
In  light  of  Mr.  Pittman’s  successful  completion  of  the  rider  and  the  IDOC’s
recommendation for probation, and notwithstanding his relatively minor behavioral glitches, the
district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction instead of placing Mr. Pittman on
probation.
2 The  collection  consisted  of  two  radios,  a  bowl,  tweezers,  a  clipper,  a  brown  glove,  two  hair
picks, headphones, excess photos, an inappropriate drawing, and a pair of gloves.  (PSI, p.183.)
8III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Pittman’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Information He Offered
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id., citing Lopez, 106
Idaho at 450.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later
show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for
reduction.  Id.
Mr. Pittman filed a Rule 35 motion asking the district court for leniency.3  (R., pp.73-74.)
In support of his request, he provided the court a letter detailing his positive growth during the
rider program, and set forth reasons why he would be successful on felony probation.  (R., p.74.)
He told the court, “I learned how to take control of my attitude against others [and] how to put
myself  in  other  people’s  shoes.”   (R.,  p.74.)   He  admitted,  “There  isn’t  any  day  or  night  that
[goes] by that I don’t think about my crime against Danielle Lance, I take full responsibility [for]
my action.”  (R., p.74.)  He also expressed concern that living in the prison environment could
put him back into his old ways of thinking; he asked for a shortened term, with probation, so that
he could begin using his improved ways of thinking right away.  (R., p.74.)
In light of this new information, and in view of Mr. Pittman’s successful performance on
3Mr. Pittman’s appeal challenges the district court’s December 28, 2016 Order that denied his
first Rule 35 motion, filed December 13th; he does not challenge the Order that denied his
successive Rule 35 motion.
9the rider program and desire for treatment and change, the district court’s refusal to reduce
Mr. Pittman’s sentence, or to place him on probation, was unreasonable, and represents an abuse
of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Pittman respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court with
instructions to place him on probation.  Alternatively, he asks this Court to reduce his sentence.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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